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Despite the importance of cognitive control in many cognitive tasks involving uncertainty, the
computational mechanisms of cognitive control in response to uncertainty remain unclear. In this
study, we develop biologically realistic neural network models to investigate the instantiation of
cognitive control in a majority function task, where one determines the category to which the
majority of items in a group belong.Two models are constructed, both of which include the same
set of modules representing task-relevant brain functions and share the same model structure.
However, with a critical change of a model parameter setting, the two models implement
two different underlying algorithms: one for grouping search (where a subgroup of items are
sampled and re-sampled until a congruent sample is found) and the other for self-terminating
search (where the items are scanned and counted one-by-one until the majority is decided). The
two algorithms hold distinct implications for the involvement of cognitive control. The modeling
results show that while both models are able to perform the task, the grouping search model fit
the human data better than the self-terminating search model. An examination of the dynamics
underlying model performance reveals how cognitive control might be instantiated in the brain
for computing the majority function.
Keywords: cognitive control, uncertainty, majority function, algorithms, computational modeling, neural networks

Introduction

majority (x , y , z ) = (x ∧ y ) ∨ (y ∧ z ) ∨ (x ∧ z ).

Our ability to rapidly process a vast amount of information and
choose one out of several potential responses depends greatly on
cognitive control – a mental function for prioritizing information
processing (Posner and Snyder, 1975; Norman and Shallice, 1986;
Posner and Rothbart, 1998). The role of cognitive control is most
clearly manifested in performing various cognitive tasks such as
the Stroop task and high-level planning. Although recent functional neuroimaging studies have revealed a set of brain regions
that might be involved in cognitive control, the computational
mechanisms underlying cognitive control remains debated (Posner
and Dehaene, 1994; Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Botvinick et al.,
2001; Wang et al., 2010).
The majority function task (MFT) is related to a common
cognitive function in which one identifies the category to which the
majority of items in a given group belong. For example, to answer
simple questions like “Are there more boys than girls in the playground?” requires the computation of the majority function. While
it would seem natural to assume that the computation depends
greatly on cognitive control, the involvement of cognitive control in
the MFT can be intriguing. On the one hand, algorithms for computing the majority function in computer science often imply little
relevance of “control” in the process. In Boolean logic, for example,
a majority function can be computed mechanically by a combinational circuit that output 1 if and only if more than half the inputs
are 1’s (Cormen et al., 1994). For example, given three input bits x,
y, and z, the majority can be computed based on the formula,

In artificial intelligence, one can implement the majority function using a perceptron with each input weight equal to 1 and the
perceptron threshold equal to n/2, where n is the number of inputs
(Russell and Norvig, 2003), again implying little involvement of
cognitive control.
On the other hand, evidence has shown that cognitive control
may play a much bigger role in human majority function computation than what these algorithms would suggest. In a recent study
we evaluated possible algorithms underlying human performance
using a computerized MFT (Fan et al., 2008). The participant was
presented a set of horizontal arrows and had to decide the direction, left or right, in which the majority of the arrows pointed.
Three algorithms were considered: exhaustive sequential search
(sequentially scanning each and every one of the arrows and then
making a final decision), self-terminating search (examining the
arrows one-by-one and stopping as soon as a majority decision
could be made), and grouping search (sampling and re-sampling
the arrows with a sample size equal to the majority threshold
until a congruent sample was found). The results showed that the
grouping search algorithm fit the data best. Since the grouping
search algorithm required that one determine the congruence
for each sampled group (i.e., all arrows in the group point in the
same direction), and in the case of incongruence, choose a different sample, the results indicated the systematic involvement
of cognitive control.
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The current study is to investigate the dynamics of cognitive
control in the MFT from a computational modeling perspective.
Using Leabra (O’Reilly and Munakata, 2000), a biologically realistic connectionist modeling framework, we have developed two
neural network models. The two models are similar in that both
involve the same set of neural modules representing task-relevant
brain functions, share the same network connections, and are able
to perform the task. However, by varying a single parameter, we
show that they implement different algorithms that hold distinct
implications for cognitive control. The modeling results show that
they fit the human data differently, highlighting the critical role of
cognitive control in the MFT.

Materials and Methods
The majority function task

The MFT described in Fan et al. (2008) was a computerized task in
which participants were presented with a set of horizontal arrows and
had to decide the direction (left or right) that the majority of arrows
pointed. In each trial, the arrow set was presented simultaneously,
at locations randomly selected from eight possible ones arranged as
an octagon centered on a fixation cross (see Figure 1). The set was
shown for 2500 ms and participants were required to make a response
by pressing one of the two keys as quickly and accurately as possible.
Responses made within the 2500 ms window terminated the display of
the arrow set, which was then followed by a variable fixation period of
2000–3000 ms, prompting participants to prepare for the next trial.

Figure 1 | The majority function task (MFT). In this task, arrows with set
size 1, 3, and 5 are randomly presented at eight possible locations arranged as
an octagon centered on a fixation cross. The arrows point either left or right and
are presented simultaneously. The participants’ task is to indicate the direction
in which the majority of arrows point. For example, if three arrows are
presented, and two point to the left and one to the right (see the “2:1” panel in
the “set size 3” column), the correct response should be “left”.The eight circles
are for illustration of the locations and are not displayed during the experiment.
Different arrow composition conditions are shown for each set size.
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The possible set sizes were 1, 3, and 5, so that the majority judgment was always unambiguous (the majority thresholds are 1, 2,
and 3, respectively). Trials were blocked by set size. Different arrow
composition conditions could be distinguished for blocks with set
sizes of 1, 3, and 5. For set size 1, the majority was the same as the
sole arrow itself (1:0). For set size 3, it was possible that two arrows
pointed to the same direction (2:1) or all three arrows pointed to the
same direction (3:0). Similarly, for set size 5, one could distinguish
three composition conditions, 3:2, 4:1, and 5:0.
This experiment design allowed us to evaluate possible algorithms
underlying human performance in the MFT (Fan et al., 2008). We
started by analyzing the amount of information that the participant
had to process in each condition before a decision could be made.
We noticed that for any given stimulus display, different algorithms
resulted in different amounts of information to be processed. Take the
case of set size 3 as an example. A straightforward exhaustive search
algorithm would require the participant to scan all three arrows before
making the judgment. Assuming that each arrow scan processed 1 bit
of information, this implied that the exhaustive search algorithm had
to process 3 bits of information for set size 3, regardless of the arrow
composition (2:1 or 3:0). This is different from the self-terminating
search algorithm, according to which search stopped as soon as the
majority could be decided upon (i.e., the number of same-direction
arrows examined was equal to the respective majority threshold).
Therefore, in the case of 3:0, only two arrow scans were necessary. In
the cases of 2:1, the best scenario was two scans and the worst scenario
was three scans. Because the probability of the best scenario was 1/3
in the experiment and the probability of the worst scenario was 2/3,
the weighted average number of arrow scans in the case of 2:1 was 2
2/3. Finally, a grouping search algorithm was also possible. Based on
this algorithm, a person could randomly select a sample of arrows
(whose size was equal to the necessary majority size, two for set size 3
and three for set size 5) and check if they were congruent (i.e., pointing in the same direction) – a response could be made if the sample
was congruent and a re-sampling was needed if it was not. Statistically
the number of samples needed for a response (i.e., the first congruent
sample, a success) follows a geometric distribution and the average is
1/p, where p is the probability of success. In the case of 2:1, for example,
p is 1/3 and the average number of samples needed is 3. The average
number of samples needed multiplied by the number of arrow in each
sample leads to the average number of arrow scans in each condition.
We then transformed these arrow scans to information measures in
bits by taking the base 2 logarithm of the number of scans.
Assuming that the amount of information to be processed directly
correlates with human performance (Hick, 1952; Hyman, 1953), we
examined the mean human RT data as a function of the amount
of information to be processed in different conditions (Fan et al.,
2008). The exhaustive search algorithm was immediately ruled out
because it did not fit the human data at all. For self-terminating
search and grouping search, we noticed that while both algorithms
could fit the human data, there was one major discrepancy with the
self-terminating search – while the algorithm predicted that the 2:1
condition involved less information to-be-processed than the 5:0
condition (2 2/3 vs 3 bits, respectively), the human data revealed
significantly longer RT in the 2:1 condition than in the 5:0 condition.
Overall, the behavioral results supported the notion that humans
tended to use the grouping search algorithm in the MFT.
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Computational models of the majority function task

One possible explanation for the Fan et al. (2008) results is that
the task requirements of the MFT encourage a grouping search
algorithm. When a majority judgment is needed as soon as possible, one may take a betting strategy and choose to look at several items at the same time (e.g., subitizing), especially if the
necessary sample size is not too large (as in the current MFT
setup) and a successful sample can quickly lead to a response.
Sequential-scanning based algorithms (either exhaustive or selfterminating), despite their simplicity, involve extra operations
such as counting and remembering (e.g., “how many right arrows
have been counted?”).
To further evaluate the plausibility of a grouping search algorithm in the MFT, it is important to examine how the mental
operations subserving the grouping search might be instantiated
in the brain. For example, one requirement for the grouping search
strategy is a mechanism of grouping. A large body of literature
in visual search has supported the notion of perceptual grouping (Treisman, 1982) and multi-object tracking (Pylyshyn, 2000,
2001). For example, it has been shown that human vision is capable
of tracking multiple (usually less than 4) objects simultaneously
(Pylyshyn, 2000, 2001). It is likely that similar mechanisms are used
in the MFT to support grouping.
An even more important requirement for the grouping strategy
is cognitive control, a mental function that is especially critical
when the amount of information to be processed is overwhelming,
or in the presence of salient distracters as in classical tasks such
as the flanker task (Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974) and the Stroop
color–word interference task (Stroop, 1935). Recent advances in
human attention research have shown that cognitive control is an
essential aspect of attention and is subserved by distinct networks
in the brain, including areas in the prefrontal cortex and anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC; Posner and Raichle, 1994; Miller, 2000; Fan
et al., 2002; Posner, 2004; Roelofs et al., 2006). Since the grouping search strategy requires a judgment of group congruence, the
involvement of cognitive control would be warranted. This is different from the sequential-scanning based algorithms, where the
requirement for cognitive control is minimal. Therefore, analyses
of the MFT performance directly lead to testable hypotheses of
specific mental operations and neural correlates underlying the
task performance.
Both issues can be addressed to a certain extent by developing
and comparing computational models of human behavior in the
MFT that implement different algorithms. Two such models were
developed in this study, one for grouping search and the other for
self-terminating search. By comparing the two models we show that
the two models required different involvement of cognitive control
and fitted human data differently. We argue that the models reveal
a plausible way of cognitive control instantiation in the brain that
underlies human performance in the MFT.

Leabra is a biologically realistic modeling framework with several
unique features. For example, Leabra neurons use an activation
function that models the known electrophysiology of real neurons
closely while keeping the computation tractable. The connections
among neurons in Leabra cannot freely change signs (i.e., changing from an excitatory link to an inhibitory link, and vice versa),
which is allowed in earlier artificial neural network systems and
has been shown to be biologically unrealistic. In addition, as a
coherently integrated framework, Leabra allows different information transformation mechanisms and different learning algorithms
(Hebbian learning, competitive learning, and error-driven learning) to simultaneously occur and interact. As a result, it is now
possible to build deeper hierarchies of neural networks to simulate
complex cognitive systems.
Brain networks

The networks in our models include not only the common regions
for visual information processing such as V1 and V4 but also regions
specifically selected based on recent cognitive neuroscience studies
with similar information processing components as in the MFT.
For example, an fMRI study on perceiving patterns in random
sequences, similar to the serial-choice RT tasks used in early information theory studies, showed that violations of repeating patterns
evoked activation in the prefrontal cortex, posterior rostral ACC,
fronto-insular cortex, and basal ganglia (Huettel et al., 2002). RT
and the amplitude of the hemodynamic response in these regions
are associated with the length of the sequence before the violation.
In another fMRI study, participants were presented with cue cards
and asked to make a two-choice response to predict whether the
next card would be higher or lower. Greater activation in the ACC
and fronto-insular cortex was associated with higher uncertainty
(Critchley et al., 2001). These regions have also been shown to be
involved in conflict processing between possible responses (Nee
et al., 2007; Wang et al., 2010). In addition, the lateral prefrontal
cortex (LPFC) and posterior parietal cortex near/along the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) have been shown to be related to information
processing evoked by the occurrence of a high information event
(Strange et al., 2005; Yoshida and Ishii, 2006) and modulate the
activity of early visual areas (Rossi et al., 2009). Finally, partially
due to the functional similarity between IPS and frontal eye fields
(FEF), we did not include the FEF in our models.
Model structure

General model description

These task-relevant brain regions were simulated in our models
by layers (see Figure 2). In particular, each model contains seven
layers with five having names roughly corresponding to those tobe-simulated brain regions. Each layer contains a certain number
of neuron units, each of which does not literally correspond to a
biological neuron per se but should be treated as a summary of a
population of neurons for a specific function. The layers, described
below, are connected in a biologically plausible way to form a
network, similar to a previous model we built for simulation of
attentional networks (Wang and Fan, 2007).

The models were developed in the connectionist modeling framework of Leabra (for local, error-driven and associative, biologically realistic algorithm; O’Reilly, 1998; O’Reilly and Munakata,
2000). In contrast to other connectionist modeling frameworks,

(1) The Input layer has 16 units with an 8 × 2 configuration.
Each row of units represents one location (so there are eight
possible locations). The two units in the same row represent

Results
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Figure 2 | A snapshot of the model structure. Each layer simulates a brain
region designated by the layer name. The five active units (yellow) in Input
represent the five arrow stimuli presented in a trial.

left‑pointing and right-pointing arrows, respectively.
Figure 2, for example, shows that there are two left-pointing
arrows and three right-pointing arrows that are presented.
(2) The V1 layer has the same configuration as that of the Input
layer. It copies activations from the Input layer through a
one-to-one projection (i.e., only corresponding units in the
two layers are connected). Therefore it serves mainly as a placeholder for the information from the Input and does not
literally correspond to the primary visual cortex.
(3) The V4 layer performs basic visual information processing
and simulates the object selection and recognition networks
in the brain. It has the same configuration as that of the V1
layer and connects from the V1 layer in a similar one-to-one
projection. One critical difference is that the V4 layer performs a sampling/selective function on its V1 inputs. That is,
it is possible that not all the units with active inputs from V1
actually fire in V4. In the five-arrow condition, for example,
while there will be five units activated in V1 only a subset (1,
2, or 3) of those corresponding units in V4 may fire. This is
implemented through a built-in mechanism in Leabra called k-winners-take-all (kWTA), which allows only a selected
few, determined by the k setting, highest activated units in a
layer to actually fire. Due to the noise in connection weights,
the selecting processing can be stochastic. As will be shown

Frontiers in Human Neuroscience

later, this is a key mechanism used in our models to implement grouping (setting k of V4 to be 1, 2, or 3, depending
on the condition) or a singleton selection (setting k of V4
to be 1).
(4) The V4 layer sends its output to the Output layer, which
contains two units, representing the “left” and “right”
response, respectively. Specifically, the “left” unit only connects to the eight units in the left columns of V4, and the
“right” unit only connects to the eight units in the right
columns of V4. The Output layer’s k is set to 1 to indicate
that only one response is desired at a time. The firing threshold of the Output unit is set in such a way that normally
it fires only when the number of active units with the same
sidedness in V4 reaches the majority threshold. For example, in the five-arrow condition, at least three units in the
left column of V4 have to fire in order for the left Output
unit to fire. As soon as an Output unit fires the network
halts, indicating that a majority decision has been made.
The number of running cycles it takes for the network to
get to this point is a measure of the model response time
(O’Reilly and Munakata, 2000). We do not commit the
Output layer to any specific region in the brain other than
saying that it summarizes the information in the V4 layer
and makes responses.
(5) The V4 layer also sends its output to the ACC layer, which
then has a bidirectional connection with the LPFC layer. The
purpose of these two layers is to monitor the activated units
in V4 and detect incongruence (arrows pointing in different
directions), if any, and therefore, simulate the function of
cognitive control in the MFT. The ACC contains two units.
The way it connects to the V4 layer is the same as the Output
layer. However its k is set to 2 and no special firing threshold
is set. The consequence of these settings is that an ACC unit
fires whenever there is an activated unit in the corresponding column of V4. The ACC layer sends its output to the
LPFC layer, which contains only one unit. The LPFC unit’s
firing threshold is set in such a way that it typically fires only
when both ACC units fire – suggesting that there are both
left-pointed and right-pointed arrows in V4. Therefore, the
LPFC layer detects incongruence by summarizing the information computed in the ACC layer.
(6) The IPS layer is specialized for spatial information processing
and simulates the “where” pathway and the orienting attentional networks in the brain. It contains eight units organized
in a column, representing the eight possible spatial locations
where arrows can appear. The IPS layer sends its output to
the V4 layer to enhance the processing of the corresponding
V4 units. There are three sources from which the IPS layer
receives input. First, it receives bottom-up input from the
V1 layer. The connection from V1 to IPS is location-based,
with two V1 units in each row connecting to the IPS unit in
the corresponding row. Second, the IPS layer receives lateral
input from (and sends output to) the V4 layer. The connection is again location-based, in a row-by-row fashion. Finally,
the IPS layer receives top-down input from the LPFC layer,
critical for the re-sampling function required in the grouping
search model described later.
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Model settings

The grouping search model

The model uses most of Leabra’s default variable settings with
a few task-specific changes summarized in Table 1. The settings
can be classified into two categories. First, most of these settings
(shown in regular font in Table 1) are tuned based on task-specific
requirements – they are set that way so that the network is capable
of performing the task in the first place. Consequentially they are set
prior to the actual simulation and remain fixed in all experimental
conditions. They are, therefore, not responsible for the main effects
we intend to study (see Figure 4). Examples in this category include:
(1) the accommodation time constant for integration in layers IPS
and Output – a 0.02 setting makes accommodation in these layers
a little faster so that a re-sampling can occur in a timely manner if
necessary; (2) the activation threshold for units in the LPFC layer.
This setting was to make sure that LPFC is fired when both ACC
neurons are active; (3) all connection weights in the network were
drawn from a uniform distribution with mean at 0.7 and variance
at 0.1. The relative projection weight-scale between layers IPS and
V4 was set to 0.5 to allow stronger bottom-up influence to avoid
phantom activation in these layers (e.g., a right V4 neuron fires at
a location where no arrow is presented in the input).
Second, there are a few settings (shown in bold in Table 1) that
are set based on each experimental condition and therefore are
directly related to the main effects in Figure 4. They include the
k setting in the V4 and IPS layers (3, 2, and 1 for conditions of set
size 5, 3, and 1, respectively) and the activation threshold in the
Output layer (0.8, 0.47, and 0.25 for conditions of set size 5, 3,
and 1, respectively). Since each condition is presented in separate
blocks (both in the behavioral study (Fan et al., 2008) and in our
simulation), the k settings are set at the beginning of each block to
designate subjects’ simple and necessary adjustment prior to that
block (e.g., “Now each trial will contain five arrows, so I need to find
three same-direction arrows as the majority”). To a certain extent
the only “parameter” we tune to fit the data patterns in Figure 4 is
the activation threshold in the Output layer, as it is systematically
changed depending on the set size.

The essence of the grouping search model has to do with its ability
to sample and re-sample the presented arrows with a given sample
size. This is mainly realized via setting k in the V4 and IPS layers
to be equal to the respective majority threshold in each condition.
Therefore the model would select a group of k arrows (in V4) initially. If these k arrows happen to all point in the same direction
(congruent), a response is made and the trial is over. Otherwise a
new group of k arrows is selected and the searching continues.
We use Figure 3, showing the snapshots of the working model at
two specific running cycles (left and right, respectively) in a given
3:2 trial, to describe how the grouping search model works. It is clear
from the Input layer in Figure 3 that three left-pointing arrows and
two right-pointing arrows are presented. Since this is in a five-arrow
condition, the k of the V4 layer is set to be 3, the majority threshold.
Figure 3A shows that at that particular moment (cycle 72) three
arrows, one left-pointing and two right-pointing ones, are selected
in V4. Of course this sample is not adequate to lead to a response –
the right Output unit is preferred but not strong enough to reach
the decision threshold. Therefore a re-sampling is necessary, which
is implemented through the ACC–LPFC–IPS–V4 loop.
Specifically, in Figure 3A both units in ACC are activated, suggesting, correctly, that the selected sample contains both left-pointing
and right-pointing arrows. This information is summarized by the
firing of the LPFC unit, indicating incongruence has been detected.
The IPS layer is notified of this incongruence through the LPFC–IPS
connection, which leads to the higher activation in the IPS layer. As
a result, the IPS units’ accommodation channels are turned on (by
setting the units’ accommodation specification to true, a standard
feature in Leabra). The effect of accommodation is that those units
that have been active for a certain time are depressed so that units
who lost the initial kWTA competition may have a chance to win and
fire – a natural re-sampling. Note that since accommodation always
punishes active units and rewards inactive units the re-sampling
is not a random sampling in a strict sense. The re-sampling result
in IPS is conveyed to the V4 layer through the bidirectional link
between IPS and V4 so that re-sampling can also occur in V4 following the lead from the IPS layer. As shown in Figure 3B, at cycle
106 the two original quiet IPS units are activated (and the three
originally activated IPS units accommodate), indicating two new
arrow locations are selected. This location information is passed to
the V4 layer, making the arrows in those locations relatively more
active. The net result in this case is that more left-column units are
activated, leading to the switch of preference in the Output layer. At
cycle 114 the left Output unit finally reaches the response threshold
and the model halts with a response.

Table 1 | Model settings (all variable settings remain fixed in all
experimental conditions except those shown in bold).
Object name

Variable name

Value

Layer V4

kWTA.k

3, 2, or 1

		

(for set size 5, 3, 1)

Layer IPS

3, 2, or 1

kWTA.k

		
Layer Output

(for set size 5, 3, 1)

Accommodation.d_bt

0.02

kWTA.k

1

Modeling results

Accommodation.d_bt

0.02

Neuron act threshold

0.8, 0.47, 0.25

For each trial, the model RT is measured by the number of cycles
that the model takes to reach the majority decision. In the grouping search theoretically the number of cycles is determined by the
number of samples (size k) scanned, which is determined by the
configuration of stimulus set (e.g., 3:2 vs 5:0).
We ran the grouping search model 24 times to simulate 24 subjects, with each subject performing 12 trials of each task condition.
The model was initialized (including both unit activations and connection weights) for each trial to induce necessary randomness and

		

(for set size 5, 3, 1)

Layer LPFC

Neuron act threshold

0.65

All connections

Weight

Uniform distribution

		

(m = 0.7, variance = 0.1)

The bidirectional

0.5

Relative weight_scale

projection
between IPS and V4
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noise. Table 2 shows the modeling results. For ease of comparison we
also list the empirical results reported in Fan et al. (2008). A visual
inspection reveals that the modeling results, in both RTs (in cycles)
and accuracies, show similar patterns as the empirical results. A
mixed-effect linear model analysis shows that the mean RTs for the
three set sizes (23.2 cycles, 53.8 cycles, and 88.6 cycles) were significantly different, F(1,140) = 46.24, p < 0.01. In set size 3, the RTs
under the two conditions (2:1 and 3:0) were significantly different,
F(1,44) = 313.87, p < 0.01. In set size 5, the RTs under the three conditions (3:2, 4:1, and 5:0) were significantly different, F(2,66) = 63.27,
p < 0.01. More importantly, the RT in the 2:1 condition was significantly longer than the RT in the 5:0 condition, t(23) = 15.16, p < 0.01,
consistent with the behavioral results in Fan et al. (2008).
To further examine the model fit, we plot the mean modeling
RTs (in cycles) as a function of task conditions, together with the
empirical data from Fan et al. (2008), shown in Figure 4. It is clear
that the model captures the main variance among task conditions.
A linear regression of empirical RTs on modeling RTs reveals a R2
of 0.95 [F(1,4) = 81.40, p < 0.01].
A

The self-terminating search model

Structurally, the self-terminating search model is exactly same
as the grouping search model. The main difference between the
two models has to do with the k setting of layers V4 and IPS.
Instead of fixing it to be the respective majority threshold in
each condition (e.g., three in the five-arrow condition) as in the
grouping search model, in the self-terminating model we set it
to be 1 initially and gradually increase it (by 1 at a time) until a
response can be made (i.e., when the number of active units with
the same sidedness in V4 reaches the majority, three in the fivearrow condition, which then causes the corresponding Output
unit to fire). This change leads to a self-terminating serial search
in that the model essentially scans the presented arrows one-byone and responds as soon as one Output unit reaches the firing
threshold. In addition, by gradually increasing k rather than fixing
it to be 1, the model basically selects a new arrow to scan at a time
and keeps all those already scanned arrows actively represented
in V4, thus emulating the counting component in a sequentialscanning based algorithm.
B

Figure 3 | Traces of the grouping search model running in a trial with three left-pointing and two right-pointing arrows, at two different time points: cycle
72 (A) and cycle 106 (B). The number in each unit is its activation, also represented by color.

Table 2 | The modeling results.
Set

Stimulus

Composition	RT (cycle)

size

condition

condition

1

0,1

3

000,111

5

Accuracy (%)

Mean

SD

Mean SDa

Mean

SD

1:0

23.21 [44.89] (520)

0.45 [1.78] (77)

1.27 [6.43] (107)

100.00 [100.00] (99.5)

0.00 [0.00] (0.9)

3:0

36.91 [65.68] (647)

1.38 [2.08] (110)

5.21 [6.24] (142)

99.93 [100.00] (100.0)

0.34 [0.00] (0.0)

001,011

2:1

70.76 [74.11] (1121)

4.38 [3.33] (153)

33.59 [10.84] (309)

81.94 [98.61] (97.5)

6.19 [2.59] (3.9)

00000,11111

5:0

57.73 [83.31] (724)

1.29 [3.87] (130)

2.70 [7.10] (174)

100.00 [100.00] (99.8)

0.00 [0.00] (0.9)

00001,01111

4:1

83.58 [91.08] (1261)

9.20 [2.36] (192)

51.88 [9.12] (349)

96.60 [99.42] (98.6)

3.24 [1.41] (2.4)

00011,00111

3:2

124.12 [99.65] (1615)

16.73 [3.60] (203)

99.69 [12.82] (392)

72.29 [94.44] (85.2)

5.53 [4.91] (6.7)

The data shown in brackets are modeling results based on the self-terminating search model; the data shown in parentheses are empirical results (in milliseconds
for RT) reported in Fan et al. (2008). Accuracy is calculated by treating all trials with running cycles larger than 600 as wrong. Wrong trials were excluded from the
RT calculation.
a
Mean of SDs across subjects.
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Figure 4 | Computational modeling results (in cycles) as a function of task conditions, together with the empirical data (in milliseconds) reported in Fan
et al. (2008).

The mechanism for dynamically increasing the parameter k is
implemented via a Leabra script, which in every running cycle
monitors the number of currently active units in V4. If this number
is less than the total number of arrows presented (i.e., not all
arrows have been scanned) and the model has not yet responded,
k is increased by 1. Note that the model responds as soon as one
Output unit reaches the firing threshold – there is no requirement
that a crucial number of arrows have to be scanned. In addition,
the model leaves the ACC–LPFC–IPS habituation loop intact so
conflict detection and re-sampling can still occur as in the grouping model. However, given the dominant effect of k increment
these networks do not play a significant role in determining the
model performance.
To demonstrate how the self-terminating model works, we
again show the running trace of the model in a given 3:2 trial (see
Figure 5). It shows that at cycle 40 only one right-pointing arrow
(in V4) was detected (Figure 5A), at cycle 61 another left-pointing
arrow were detected (Figure 5B), at cycle 76 an additional leftpointing arrow was detected (Figure 5C), and finally at cycle 90,
another left arrow had been detected (Figure 5D). Given that at
this moment three left-pointing arrows had been detected, the
model then terminated with a left response, and the k setting
of the V4 and IPS layers had now been increased to 4. The final
RT measure was the number of cycles that it took for an Output
node to fire.
Modeling results

We again ran 24 simulated subjects with the model and the modeling results are shown in Table 2 and Figure 4, together with the
grouping search model results and the data from human subjects.
A visual inspection shows that a mismatch between the selfterminating search model results and the human data is evident.
A mixed-effect linear model analysis shows that the mean RTs for
the three set sizes (44.9 cycles, 69.9 cycles, and 91.4 cycles) were
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significantly different, F(1,140) = 276.53, p < 0.01. In set size 3,
the RTs under the two conditions (2:1 and 3:0) were significantly
different, F(1,44) = 36.28, p < 0.01. In set size 5, the RTs under
the three conditions (3:2, 4:1, and 5:0) were significantly different,
F(2,66) = 31.45, p < 0.01. Most importantly, the modeling RT in
the 2:1 condition was significantly shorter than the modeling RT
in the 5:0 condition, t(23) = −12.69, p < 0.01. This is inconsistent with the human behavioral results but consistent with what
the self-terminating search algorithm predicts (Fan et al., 2008).
A linear regression of empirical RTs on model RTs reveals a R2 of
0.70 [F(1,4) = 9.30, p > 0.03], worse than the fit of the grouping
search model.

Discussion
Cognitive control refers to processes that flexibly and adaptively
allocate mental resources to permit selection of thoughts and
actions directed by our intentions and goals under a certain context
(Posner and Snyder, 1975; Miller, 2000; Badre, 2008; Kouneiher
et al., 2009; Solomon et al., 2009), and has been implicated in
a range of cognitive tasks involving attention, learning, and
decision-making. Although the relationship between the activity of the frontoparietocingulate system and cognitive control
has been consistently demonstrated in functional neuroimaging
studies, the underlying computational mechanisms and dynamics of how these brain regions work together to implement the
function of cognitive control remains unclear. The present study
investigates the instantiation of cognition control by developing
biologically realistic neural network models to perform a simple
MFT, with the intention that the results can be extended to explain
the computational underpinnings of cognitive control in other
more complex tasks.
Search for the majority of a given item set is a common task and
it is surprising that few studies have been conducted to understand
how people perform the task. One reason may have to do with the
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A

B

C

D

Figure 5 | Traces of the self-terminating search model running in a trial with three left-pointing and two right-pointing arrows, at four different time
points: cycle 40 (A), cycle 61 (B), cycle 76 (C), and cycle 90 (D). Note that the persistent activity in the IPS layer in the face of incongruity in the sample is mainly
due to the dynamics generated by increasing k during the trial.

fact that it can be easily done algorithmically, often via designed circuits or built-in functions. In statistics, the majority function is associated with mode, a statistic representing the value that occurs the
most frequently in a data set, which is often readily shown by histograms. Fan et al. (2008) have developed a task to study how humans
perform the majority function in a well-controlled environment.
A careful analysis of the computational load required by different
algorithms suggests that instead of using intuitive search strategies
such as exhaustive search or self-terminating search, humans may
adopt a grouping search algorithm, which involves sampling and
re-sampling the item set with a majority-determining size.
It is important to note that the majority search, even in the
context of MFT, is clearly relevant to ordinary visual search, on
which a large body of research has been conducted (Treisman, 1982;
Wolfe et al., 1989; Grossberg et al., 1994; Pylyshyn, 1994; Najemnik
and Geisler, 2005). One might speculate that a possible pop-out
mechanism exists for same-directional arrows in a stimulus set.
However, given the close spatial proximity and perceptual similarity
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of the arrows, the perceptual basis of this pop-out is weak. In addition, the memory requirement (i.e., how many items in a given
category have already been found) is greatly magnified in the MFT.
As a result, in order to perform the task in a more efficient way,
decisions of where to search next (which may not involve over eye
movements) and when to make the response are critical, making a
guided search a possibility (Niwa and Ditterich, 2008). However, to
what degree such decisions depend on cognitive control has been
unclear (Gray et al., 2006).
The grouping search algorithm makes distinctive claims regarding the involvement of cognitive control in the task than other
more straightforward algorithms such as the self-terminating
search. Based on the grouping search algorithm, for every selected
group a judgment of group congruence has to be made, and in
the case of incongruence a different group has to be selected and
examined. Therefore, the algorithm implies the heavy and continuous involvement of cognitive control for conflict detection
and re-sampling. This is different from those sequential-scanning
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based algorithms, where one can identify and count arrows oneby-one until a final decision can be made – no congruence judgment is explicitly necessary in these algorithms (Schall, 2001).
On the other hand, the grouping search algorithm also implies
that the task performance will be sensitive to the configuration of stimulus set. For those highly incongruent stimulus sets
(e.g., three left arrows and two right arrows, compared to five
left arrows), since the probability of selecting an incongruent
sample is high, the likelihood of re-sampling is high, leading to
longer reaction times.
A straightforward parallel search model, where all arrows in a
presented stimulus set are simultaneously selected and processed
(e.g., via setting k for the V4 and IPS layers to 5 in the five-arrow
conditions), would presumably predict that all conditions of equal
stimulus set size (e.g., 3:2, 4:1, and 5:0) have roughly same response
time (i.e., the Output unit representing the majority will win out
easily in all conditions). However, it is possible to augment this
simple parallel search model with a mechanism to quantify the
incongruence in a parallel fashion. For example, a mutual competition between two units in the Output layer (via setting its k to 1 in
the current model) allows increased RTs in response to incongruent stimuli without engaging the whole V4–ACC–LPFC–IPS–V4
loop (see Gilbert and Shallice, 2002, for an example of incongruent competition in the context of Stroop effect). Neurally, such a
mutual competition leads to activity normalization between two
decision units, and neither unit would quickly reach a high decision threshold for a response (i.e., slow RT in this case) when
they are comparably activated (e.g., driven by equally salient
incongruent stimuli), leading to a pattern of RTs as a function
of signal-to-noise ratio in evidence-based decision-making (e.g.,
Wong et al., 2007; Grossberg and Pilly, 2008). Note that in such a
model the ACC–LPFC networks can still detect incongruence if
any, but the effect of such detection could be too late to delay the
response (i.e., an Output unit may have already fired). To a certain
extent the grouping model can be regarded as an enhanced version of this augmented parallel search model in the sense that in
the grouping model (1) a subset of stimuli can be simultaneously
processed; and (2) the sensitivity to signal-to-noise ratio in different conditions is magnified by conflict detection through the
V4–ACC–LPFC–IPS–V4 loop.
With advances in functional brain imaging, these claims
lead to further hypotheses regarding possible brain activity
and connectivity to support task performance. While it would
be necessary to carry out functional brain imaging studies to
examine the involvement of these brain areas, it is hard to reveal
the dynamics of the brain in instantiating the computation. In
the current study we show that we can study the dynamics of
majority function computation in the brain by developing biologically realistic computational models of the task. In general
a biologically plausible computational model that can perform
the task in similar conditions as humans do and produce results
that fit the human data provides not only an existence proof
of the underlying algorithm but also a detailed process-based
explanation for how the algorithm might be implemented in
the brain (Marr, 1982; Anderson and Lebiere, 1998; O’Reilly and
Munakata, 2000; O’Reilly, 2006; McClelland, 2009; Sun, 2009).
Specifically, we developed two models of MFT performance,
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one simulating a grouping search algorithm and the other one
simulating a self-terminating search algorithm. The two models
share the same network structure and both are able to perform
the task. Nevertheless, they involve the function of cognitive
control differently.
The grouping search model demonstrates how modules simulating different brain functions work together to instantiate cognitive control for the majority function computation. Two critical
components of the algorithm, sampling and re-sampling, are
implemented through Leabra’s built-in kWTA mechanism and
the joint work of the V4–ACC–LPFC–IPS loop. With k in V4 and
IPS set to be the respective threshold in each condition, sampling
is naturally implemented in V4. Because the network weights are
randomly set, the initial sampling can be random as well. When
a congruent sample is selected, a response can be quickly generated. When an incongruent sample is selected, the incongruence
is detected and re-sampling occurs. More importantly, the model
shows that cognitive control, important for the detection of incongruence in the selected sample and subserved by a set of neural
modules, is recruited to modulate re-sampling. The longer RT
in the 2:1 condition than that in the 5:0 condition, for example,
is vividly explained by the frequent activations of the ACC and
LPFC layers and the subsequent extra re-sampling processes in
the 2:1 condition but the lack of those in the 5:0 condition. These
results highlight the particular involvement of ACC and LPFC in
implementing the function of cognitive control in the MFT and
similar tasks.
It is interesting to note that the grouping search model can be
revised to implement the self-terminating search, but the resulting
model fails to fit the human data. The essential change concerns the
k setting in V4 and IPS layers, which is gradually increased to simulate the sequential scanning and counting, a necessary component
of the self-terminating search. The result that the self-terminating
model fails to fit the human data to a certain extent provides further
support for the claim that the grouping search model captures some
essential constraints of cognitive control in the task. However, it is
important to note that other models are certainly possible and many
claims of the grouping search model are open to further experimental investigation. For example, it is possible to implement the
self-terminating search more literally by fixing the k setting in V4
and IPS layers to be 1 (rather than gradually increasing it) and adding recurrent connections for both units in the model Output layer
to achieve evidence accumulation over time as a way of counting.
By doing so, although the model V4 explicitly samples one item at
a time, a correct decision can still be made based on the sampling
history maintained in the model Output layer.

Conclusion
We conclude by arguing that the different involvement of cognitive control differentiates the two models. In the grouping search
model, the involvement of ACC and LPFC is essential since it is
the function of these layers that detects conflict and eventually
triggers and implements the re-sampling. On the contrary, in the
self-terminating search model, the involvement of the ACC and
LPFC functions is not required. Taken together, the models demonstrate how cognitive control might be instantiated in the brain
to support the MFT.
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